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ABSTRACT 
A connected vehicle (CV) environment is composed of a diverse data collection, data 
communication and dissemination, and computing infrastructure systems that are vulnerable to the 
same cyberattacks as all traditional computing environments. Cyberattacks can jeopardize the 
expected safety, mobility, energy, and environmental benefits from connected vehicle 
applications. As cyberattacks can lead to severe traffic incidents, it has become one of the primary 
concerns in connected vehicle applications. In this paper, we investigate the impact of cyberattacks 
on the vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) network from a V2I application point of view. Then, we 
develop a novel V2I cybersecurity architecture, named CVGuard, which can detect and prevent 
cyberattacks on the V2I environment. In designing CVGuard, key challenges, such as scalability, 
resiliency and future usability were considered. A case study using a distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) on a V2I application, i.e., the Stop Sign Gap Assist (SSGA) application, shows that 
CVGuard was effective in mitigating the adverse effects created by a DDoS attack. In our case 
study, because of the DDoS attack, conflicts between the minor and major road vehicles occurred 
in an unsignalized intersection, which could have caused potential crashes. A reduction of conflicts 
between vehicles occurred because CVGuard was in operation. The reduction of conflicts was 
compared based on the number of conflicts before and after the implementation and operation of 
the CVGuard security platform. Analysis revealed that the strategies adopted by the CVGuard 
were successful in reducing the inter-vehicle conflicts by 60% where a DDoS attack compromised 
the SSGA application at an unsignalized intersection. 
Keywords: Connected vehicles, V2I, cybersecurity, V2I security architecture. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The driving force behind a country’s economy is a surface transportation system that enables 
reliable and efficient transportation of passengers and goods. Despite remarkable improvements 
in vehicle design and performance, which has improved vehicle safety, the number of fatalities is 
still very high. Annually more than 30,000 fatalities occur on US highways alone (1), and in the 
European Union almost 25,700 road fatalities were reported (2). To reduce a large number of 
roadway crashes and the associated societal costs, different countries have been promoting 
connectivity between vehicles, known as vehicle-to-vehicle communication or V2V, and between 
vehicles and transportation infrastructure components, which is vehicle-to-infrastructure 
communication or V2I. This type of Intelligent Transportation System strategy has the potential 
to reduce roadway crashes significantly. 
V2V and V2I enabled vehicles are emerging as next-generation vehicles for surface 
transportation systems, leveraging the rapidly growing information and communication 
technology. Connected vehicles (CVs) share information with other vehicles and with 
transportation infrastructure using wireless communication that increases traffic safety, provides 
efficient mobility services and reduces environmental impacts (3). However, the risk of cyber-
attacks increases as vehicles become more connected through the Internet, and wireless networks. 
One of the cyberattack gateways to connected vehicles is V2I. Cyberattacks on V2I 
communication can have devastating consequences if V2I systems are not properly secured. V2I 
applications present a variety of vulnerabilities that create an attractive target for hackers. For 
example, hackers could take control of traffic signals, create hazards, and even cause a breakdown 
of the traffic system. Thus, it is critical to develop new security solutions to protect the V2I 
environment. 
The Connected Vehicle Reference Implementation Architecture (CVRIA) (4), as developed 
by the US Department of Transportation (USDOT), has defined hundreds of CV applications to 
date. Among them, more than 20 applications are related to V2I. Many of these applications are 
related to V2I safety (e.g., curve speed warning, in-vehicle signage, and Stop Sign Gap Assist).  
According to CVRIA, all these applications share some common sub-applications (e.g., speed 
warnings, intersection safety), and use common processes (e.g., collecting roadside safety data and 
processing collected vehicle safety data) to support this application layer. For this reason, data 
flows can pose security risks when shared between these applications. Thus, if a cybersecurity risk 
is present in any of the shared sub-applications or processes, other applications might be at risk.  
Much research has been conducted on enabling privacy, maintaining authentication, and 
providing integrity by targeting in-vehicle and V2V communication. However, very few studies 
focus on V2I-level security as a part of the in-vehicle and V2V security solutions (5–7). Therefore, 
research that is solely focused on V2I security solutions needs more attention. Primarily, in this 
paper, we evaluate the significance of V2I application security. Then, we present an innovative 
V2I security architecture, CVGuard, which can identify, prevent, and provide countermeasures 
against security threats and protect V2I applications from being compromised by cyberattacks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review 
followed by the CVGuard development method. Section 3 provides an overview of CVGuard 
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operation and benefits. In Section 4, a case study is conducted by selecting one of the cyberattacks, 
a DDoS on a V2I application, Stop Sign Gap Assist (SSGA) application. Section 4 also articulates 
the detection and prevention techniques adopted in CVGuard for a DDoS attack. Moreover, based 
on the case study on the SSGA application, Section 4 depicts the capability and effectiveness of 
CVGuard based on its ability to reduce conflicts caused by a DDoS attack. Conclusions, future 
work, and limitations are addressed in Section 5. 
2.0 V2I SECURITY-RELATED STUDIES 
In this section, the primary goal is to summarize the cybersecurity aspects of the connected vehicle 
environment. Before developing a cybersecurity solution, it is necessary to determine 
cybersecurity requirements, different types of potential V2I attacks, and existing V2I security 
solutions. Also, a review of the emerging technologies is imperative while developing a 
cybersecurity solution for V2I applications: 
2.1 V2I Security Requirements 
In a connected vehicle environment, vehicles can communicate with internal (i.e., V2S (vehicle-
to-sensor)) and external environments, such as, V2V and V2I, including roadside units (RSUs) 
that use dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) (8). An on-board unit (OBU) placed inside 
a vehicle transmits information to the surrounding environment. RSUs collect data from vehicles 
and applications installed in an RSU deliver the requested service (9).  According to CVRIA, all 
security solutions related to V2I and V2V must focus on three core elements: confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (10). 
2.1.1 Confidentiality  
The content of the messages exchanged in a V2I environment must be kept confidential, i.e., the 
content cannot be accessed by unauthorized and unintended users. However, most messages in a 
connected vehicle environment are public, particularly the exchanged messages between vehicles 
and infrastructure. Data confidentiality and message confidentiality need to be taken into 
consideration when designing a secure V2I environment (11).  
2.1.2 Integrity  
Messages exchanged between a vehicle and infrastructure must be protected from any 
unauthorized alteration or modification. This ensures the accuracy, reliability, and trustworthiness 
of the messages. Every security solution must provide protection from unauthorized intentional or 
unintentional modifications. Loss of integrity can result in the degradation of services provided by 
a V2I environment (12). 
2.1.3 Availability 
Availability ensures that systems and information are accessible and usable to authorized 
individuals. In a V2I environment, all RSUs must be available at all times. For example, the critical 
latency for an intersection collision warning must be less than 100 milliseconds (13). Also, all 
security solutions must provide an operational system even in the presence of faults or risky 
conditions.  
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2.2  V2I Cyber Attacks 
Classifications of malicious activities and security threats as well as attackers in the vehicular 
environment have been discussed in existing literature. In (14) and (15), security attackers are 
classified as internal or external based on membership functionality. Activity levels determine 
whether the attackers are active or passive. Assessment of intention or reason for an attack has 
classified attackers as rational or malicious. However, existing work focuses solely on unraveling 
the problems behind the V2V security attacks. Our research is aimed at V2I cyberattacks in the 
context of emerging connected vehicle applications. Table 1 shows the cyberattacks that are likely 
to happen in a V2I interface based on the vulnerability of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
with the projected likelihood of an attack ranked as HIGH, MODERATE, and LOW. This table 
provides an overall understanding of the effect of potential cyberattacks on a V2I interface (15).  
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TABLE 1 Different Types of Cyberattacks in V2I Environment (5-7, 10, 11, 13–15) 
Attack Type 
Compromised Security Element Effect of Attack on Vehicle-to- 
Infrastructure environment 
 
Availability Integrity Confidentiality Likelihood 
Distributed 
Denial of 
Service 
(DDoS) 
HIGH MODERATE LOW 
Unavailability of service, network collapse, 
defeating service integrity  
HIGH 
Impersonation LOW MODERATE HIGH 
Disturbing the network, hiding identity, and 
gaining privileges are the primary motives of the 
attacker. 
HIGH 
Message 
alternation 
MODERATE HIGH MODERATE 
Affects integrity and confidentiality of the V2I 
environment, thereby impacting the safety 
service provided by RSUs. Responding to this 
type of attack depends on anti-theft solutions 
provided by vehicles or RSUs. 
MODERATE 
Malware and 
spam 
MODERATE LOW HIGH 
Malware can cause potential serious disruption 
in service for an RSU. The impact is considered 
high due to its long-lasting outages. Malware can 
be injected into the system during a software 
update of RSUs. 
LOW 
Eavesdropping LOW LOW HIGH 
Both active and passive attackers can steal 
sensitive and private information, which violates 
the confidentiality of drivers, and vehicles.  
MODERATE 
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2.3 Emerging Technologies 
Currently, several new technologies have emerged to make communication networks more secure, 
more scalable, and capable of achieving more fine-grained control. In the following sections, we 
briefly discuss the use of these emerging technologies in terms of V2I security solutions.    
2.3.1 Edge Computing  
Edge computing is a method where the data is processed close to the data source. Edge computing 
offers dynamic content management, proper resource allocation, and low latency. It ensures high 
bandwidth by distributing the computational tasks to different edges (16, 17). In the context of 
V2I, security modules need to be near the source of data (i.e., RSU) for faster processing, which 
can be achieved by edge computing.  
2.3.2 Software-Defined Networking (SDN) 
Traditional network management is complex, brittle, and error-prone (18). Those issues are caused 
by the strong coupling of the data plane (used for data forwarding) and control plane (used for 
routing logic, packet management, and access control). By decoupling the control plane and data 
plane, and by introducing programmability, SDN simplifies the network management tasks (e.g., 
reconfiguring network topology, changing routing logic) and provides more flexibility with respect 
to data distribution. In a CV environment, SDN can be used to dynamically reroute the data to 
different destinations as necessary. (22) shows an example of leveraging SDN to provide more 
flexible protection strategies and better resource management in the defense of cyberattacks while 
minimizing network congestion and user-perceived latency. We believe that SDN can aid in the 
construction of V2I threat protection systems. 
2.3.3 Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) 
Network functions such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are currently 
implemented in specialized hardware such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA)(19). 
Although specialized hardware gives better performance, it also leads to high cost, maintenance 
complexity, and inflexibility. NFV has emerged to overcome these problems(20). NFV reduces 
cost and provides new opportunities in scalability and implementation of network functions in 
commodity hardware having fine-grained control (21). NFV and SDN could play a major role in 
securing the CV environment in the near future, as leading industry players (e.g., Verizon, AT&T) 
are embracing these modern technologies (22, 23).   
This paper focuses on V2I network-level security and presents a newly developed distributed 
computational platform, CVGuard, which ensures confidentiality, integrity, and availability by 
leveraging emerging edge computing, SDN, and NFV technologies.  
3.0 DEVELOPMENT OF CVGUARD 
To achieve our research objective, the first step was to define the components and functionalities 
of the CVGuard system and to create a formulation of the CV environment to detect and prevent 
networked-vehicle cyberattacks. 
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FIGURE 1 CVGuard: connected vehicle V2I security architecture. 
3.1  System Overview      
CVGuard is a new software-based security architecture designed to protect V2I applications, 
leveraging three emerging technologies: edge computing, SDN, and NFV. The primary goal of 
CVGuard is to detect and isolate any cyberattacks in a V2I environment before they can negatively 
affect vehicles or transportation networks, which could lead to crashes and impede the adoption of 
connected vehicle technologies. Figure 1 shows a high-level vision of CVGuard, which contains 
two major components. The first primary component consists of customized microBoxes (small 
network-security functions). These small software modules are situated in each fixed edge (e.g., 
RSU) and act as security gateways for each vehicle (i.e., mobile edge). They also provide dynamic 
attack capturing and analysis abilities for V2I interfaces. The second major component is the 
CVGuard controller, which is logically centralized and resides in the cloud as a regional edge 
where it monitors the contexts of different vehicles, RSUs as well as V2I communications. The 
CVGuard controller also identifies security threats, analyzes the threats, and controls microBoxes 
to eliminate the threats. RSUs represent the entry point for potential cyberattacks, and the 
microBoxes in each RSU do edge computing on incoming data to detect cyberattacks in the first 
layer of CVGuard. Because of resource constraints, and to provide better service, security 
functions need to consume as few resources as possible (e.g., memory, processing time). The small 
software security functions in microBoxes ensure an efficient use of resources in an RSU by being 
created only when needed and destroyed when no longer necessary. Also, communication 
networking between RSUs is necessary to disseminate the attack information among neighboring 
RSUs. By leveraging NFV and SDN technologies, the CVGuard controller can create or destroy 
security functions flexibly and quickly. The CVGuard controller can also dynamically route attack 
information and prevention policies to the relevant security functions. Furthermore, the CVGuard 
controller acts as a centralized security function controller to enable dynamic interoperation and 
automatic reconfiguration of software security functions, which are distributed in different RSUs.  
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CVGuard supports two types of network security functions: i) attack detection as provided by 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) (24) and DDoS detectors (25) as well as ii) attack prevention as 
provided by firewalls and the intrusion prevention system (IPS) (24). Once the attack detection 
functions discover a potential threat, CVGuard identifies the problem and dynamically launches 
attack prevention functions to adopt the necessary resolution strategies. Both attack detection and 
prevention mechanisms in CVGuard are discussed in the following subsections. 
3.1.1 Attack detection 
CVGuard attack detection is based on dynamic security policies and rules, which are developed 
based on a CV environment where all vehicles are in motion and continuously broadcast the basic 
safety messages (BSM)–Part 1 at a rate of 10 Hz (10 packets/second) (26). Using wireless 
communication, each vehicle can communicate within a certain range. From the RSU range of 
influence, being a static component in the CV environment, vehicles come into the range of 
communication with the RSU and leave the range after a certain period. To quantify the CV 
environment, representation of the properties and functionalities of CV components in a proper 
and realistic manner is essential. For example, each vehicle can be represented as a moving 
vehicular node having properties, such as speed (𝑆𝑖), and location (𝐿𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦)). Table 2 denotes the 
common properties of the components found in the CV environment:  
TABLE 2 Properties of a Vehicular Node 
Symbol Description 
𝐿𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) Location of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ vehicle with a longitude of x and a latitude of y. 
𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑢(𝑥, 𝑦) Location of the 𝑅𝑆𝑈 with a longitude of x and a latitude of y. 
𝑆𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) Two-dimensional speed of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ vehicle  
𝑆𝑖 Resultant speed of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  vehicle  
𝑅𝑖 Communication range of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  vehicle 
𝑅𝑟𝑠𝑢 Communication range of RSU 
𝑇𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 Time when the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ vehicle comes into RSU’s communication range 
𝑇𝑖,𝑒𝑛𝑑 Time when the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ vehicle leaves the RSU’s communication range 
𝐷𝑖,𝑗 Distance between the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ vehicle and the 𝑗𝑡ℎ vehicle 
𝑒𝑖,𝑗 Neighbor relationship between the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ vehicle and the 𝑗𝑡ℎ vehicle 
?̃? Possible maximum capacity of a neighbor’s vehicle 
𝑁𝑟𝑠𝑢 Number of vehicles within the communication range of an RSU 
𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖 Data receiving rate of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ vehicle 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 Maximum speed of a roadway 
𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 Minimum speed of a roadway 
 
Based on the properties of a vehicular node as listed in Table 2, we can formulate the rules needed 
in a CV environment. The following rules hold true representing the normal behavior of a vehicle 
without cyberattack: 
a) Each RSU has a communication range based on the medium of communication (e.g., the 
recommended DSRC range is up to 300 m or 984 ft (27)). Thus, an RSU will only receive 
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data from those vehicles, which are within the DSRC range. An anomalous location can be 
detected using the following rule: 
|𝐿𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) − 𝐿𝑟𝑠𝑢(𝑥, 𝑦)| < 𝑅𝑟𝑠𝑢 (1) 
b) The RSU contains the roadway geometry information (e.g., road location, map 
information) of its surrounding area. Also, the location of each vehicle will be located 
inside the roadway geometry.  
 𝐿𝑖  (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦 (2) 
c) A predictive approach to the location of vehicles can be computed. If 
 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦) denotes the current location of a vehicle, and  𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) denotes the 
previous location of the same vehicle. Then, the relationship between them can be 
represented as follows, where 𝛿  is a constant dependent on the traffic situation (e.g., traffic 
volume, queue): 
| 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦)| ≤ | 𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) +  𝛿 (3) 
d) Usually, each vehicle will maintain a minimum driving distance (ϵ) from other vehicles 
(Equation 4), and headway ( ℎ𝑖 ) from the vehicle immediately in front (Equation 5). 
| 𝐿𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦) −  𝐿𝑗 (𝑥, 𝑦)| > 𝜖 (4) 
| 𝐿𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦) −  𝐿𝑖+1 (𝑥, 𝑦)| ≈  ℎ𝑖  (5) 
e) Each vehicle will broadcast BSM at a certain rate, and RSU will receive that data at a rate 
no higher than its dissemination rate, C1. 
𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖 ≤ C1             (6) 
f) RSU will receive data from each vehicle. To provide a proper service by RSU, the DRR 
must be higher than the threshold value C2. 
𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖 ≥  C2             (7) 
g) Having a defined communication range, the RSU can accommodate a certain number of 
vehicles within its communication range. 
𝑁𝑟𝑠𝑢 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑅𝑆𝑈 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 (8) 
h) Vehicles can communicate with a certain number of vehicles inside its communication 
range. 
?̃? < 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒  (9) 
i) The network structure or topology can be determined by defining the neighborhood where 
two vehicles ( 𝑉𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑗 ) are defined as neighbors if their physical distance is less than a 
defined range (µ).     
𝑉𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑗 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠(𝑒𝑖,𝑗 = 1), 𝑖𝑓 |𝐿𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦) −  𝐿𝑗 (𝑥, 𝑦)| < µ (10) 
j) For a certain road section or corridor, the speed of each vehicle will be within a certain 
boundary: 
𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑆𝑖 ≤  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 (11) 
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k) A vehicle (𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒) will come into the range of communication with RSU at time 
 𝑇𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 and leave the communication range at 𝑇𝑖,𝑒𝑛𝑑. Because of a defined communication 
range(𝑅𝑟𝑠𝑢) for the RSU, the difference between 𝑇𝑖,𝑒𝑛𝑑 and  𝑇𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 will be less than 
constant, 𝜏.   
𝑇𝑖,𝑒𝑛𝑑 −  𝑇𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 ≤  𝜏 (12) 
    In CVGuard, these rules reside inside the microBoxes that monitor the context of each vehicle. 
The incoming vehicles’ data and a policy set consisting of behavior rules and violation rules are 
given as input into microBox. Both the vehicles’ data and policy set act as a small software security 
module. The set of policies are dynamically created by the CVGuard controller and fed to the 
microBoxes. Based on the set of rules and types of violations, a microBox can detect the attack 
types performed by different attackers. Figure 2 depicts the abstract idea of the detection method. 
In Figure 2, a cyberattack X type is identified if the vehicular data violates policy P, which consists 
of rules:{a, b}. Similarly, violation of a policy set Q that consists of a rule set {b, c, d} results in a 
Y type cyberattack.  
3.1.2 Attack prevention 
Depending on the type of attack, CVGuard can take countermeasures aimed at prevention. On the 
detection of any attack, the microBox will steer the data from the attackers and legitimate vehicles 
into the prevention system as shown in Figure 2. Then the attacker's data is quarantined and fed to 
a CV application based on the need of the application. For example, if a vehicle performs a fake 
location attack, the RSU can perform an estimation of the correct location of the attackers based 
on the data collected from other vehicles. Then this localized value can be fed to CV applications. 
Prevention policies can be changed dynamically based on the type of attack using the CVGuard 
controller, which makes the system more flexible, robust, and scalable. For example, for a DDoS 
attack, the violation set includes {e, f}, which creates a higher DRR for one vehicle, causing the 
DRR of the other vehicles to lower. In prevention of DDoS, CVGuard can drop or filter the data 
based on the application need to ensure a proper output from the CV application. 
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FIGURE 2 microBox workflow for both attack detection and prevention. 
4.0 CASE STUDY: STOP SIGN GAP ASSIST (SSGA) APPLICATION 
In this section, we conducted a case study from the vantage point of a V2I application, i.e., an 
SSGA application. We are going to define and develop a DDoS attack model and later use that 
model to evaluate the adverse effects on the SSGA application.  
4.1 SSGA application overview 
In our case study, we have selected a V2I safety application, SSGA. The goal of the application is 
to improve the safety of an unsignalized intersection (having a posted stop sign) by providing 
safety-related warning and advisory messages to the incoming vehicles at the intersection. In an 
SSGA application, minor road vehicles are approaching the stop sign, and an RSU is providing 
safety messages to minor road vehicles based on the state of the intersection (e.g., available safe 
gap of the major road vehicles). At the intersection, SSGA alerts and warning messages indicate 
unsafe gaps based on the approaching major road vehicle’s speed and distance from the 
intersection. As a result of real-time warning and alert messaging, the number of right-angle 
crashes will be reduced in the intersection (27, 28). The performance of the SSGA application 
depends on the data availability from the vehicles traveling on the major and minor roads. Being 
a safety-related application, if compromised, the related misinformation can cause crashes at an 
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unsignalized intersection. Because of the safety significance of SSGA, this application is suitable 
for the case study in determining the effectiveness of the CVGuard system. 
4.2 Development of DDoS attack model 
We focused on a general DDoS (e.g., SYN flood) attack against the CV application running in the 
roadside infrastructure. The advisory’s aim is to exhaust the network and compromise the CV 
applications. The SYN flood attack is one kind of DDoS attack where a huge number of 
unnecessary data is transmitted by the attacker (29). By creating the SYN flood attack, the services 
from the CV application can be made unavailable, as this will exhaust the computation resource 
of the applications. We assume, the advisory model controls its own single or multiple OBUs and 
can control other vehicles’ OBUs to create this attack. The attackers’ goal is to compromise safety 
applications to cause a catastrophic situation. Because a safety application, for example SSGA 
only takes BSM data to compute the safety operations, we assume that the attacker will create 
SYN flood with BSM only. For simplicity, we restricted this study to focus on only one element 
of the roadside infrastructure, RSU. 
In the development process of the DDoS attack model, a formulation of a DDoS attack was first 
developed to evaluate the feasibility of the attack. Second, from commercially available DSRC 
devices, the value of parameters (e.g., DSRC channel availability, packet size, transmission 
latency, and capacity) needed for creating the DDoS attack were extracted. Third, using these 
extracted parameters, in a simulation environment, the attack was launched against the SSGA 
application. Details of these steps are as follows: 
4.2.1 Formulation of the DDoS attack model 
Attacker vehicles launch the DDoS attack by flooding the communication channel. Typically, an 
attacker uses its maximum transmission capacity to flood the network. To create a breakdown of 
V2I application, attackers need to transmit more data than the receiver’s (e.g., RSU) maximum 
receiving capacity that can be calculated as 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠′ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≥  𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠′ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (11) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ (𝑇𝑥𝑎) ≥  𝐶𝑅𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 (12) 
where 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 is the number of attackers, 𝑇𝑥𝑎 is the attacker’s transmission rate, and 𝐶𝑅𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 is 
the maximum message receiving capacity of an RSU. Once the attackers flood the network, the 
RSU will not be able to receive data from legitimate vehicles, and will be unable to provide proper 
services (e.g., gap alert and warnings) to legitimate vehicles. The ability to perform a successful 
attack depends on the attackers’ transmission rate (?̃?), the receivers’ receiving capacity (e.g., 
RSU)(𝑥), average packet size (𝑦), transmission overhead (?̃?), and percentage of service channel 
(SCH) availability (𝜌). By using these dependent parameters as shown in Equation (12), we can 
then use Equation (13) to estimate the number of attackers (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠) needed to create a DDoS 
attack on a V2I application. 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ≥ 𝜌 (
1
𝑥
 ?̃? +  𝑜 ̃ ×
106
8𝑦
 × 𝑥) (13) 
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4.2.2 Parameter extraction from the real devices  
The next step is to verify the feasibility of creating a DDoS attack when the attackers are using 
real devices based on Equation (13). This feasibility analysis was conducted on commercially 
available RSUs. The goal was to find the attacker’s capacity (e.g., minimum overhead and latency 
of transmission) with different configurations; then, the extracted values were used to create DDoS 
attacks in the simulation. Our experiment shows that the minimum transmission overhead at 
approximately 2.456 milliseconds (ms) with 1 millisecond from the inter-packet gap (IPG) when 
the device is configured at 3 mbps. Also, on the receiver side, for a single radio, a 46 ms window 
is available for a SCH in a 100ms time window; thus, the available SCH is 46% of the time of an 
RSU [16]. Using this latency and other standard configurations as shown below, Equation (13) 
gives the minimum number of on-board units (OBUs) (min(𝑁 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠)=3) that are considered as 
attackers to create a DDoS attack in our experiment, which consists of the following parameters 
 Average packet size, 𝑦 = 220 bytes 
 Attackers’ transmission rate, 𝑥 ̃= 3 mbps 
 Receiver’s receiving capacity, 𝑥 =12 mbps 
 Total transmission overhead, 𝑜 ̃= IPG+Transmission overhead = (1 + 2.456) ms,   
So,  𝑜  ̃= 3.45 6 ms = 0.003465 sec. 
 SCH availability, ρ = 46% 
 Minimum number of attackers required, 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ≥ 2.83 or  min(𝑁 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠) = 3 
 
4.3 CV-Application level impact under DDoS attack 
Using the latency parameters from commercially available DSRC devices as described in Section 
4.2, different attack scenarios were created to evaluate the impact of DDoS attacks on SSGA in 
the simulation. With a different number of attackers, the performance of an RSU was evaluated 
based on the data receiving rate by the application. As the attackers were flooding the RSU, a 
significant amount of data from legitimate vehicles was lost. As shown in Figure 3, with the 
increasing number of attackers, DRR by the application decreased due to the DDoS attack. With 
five attackers, the DRR dropped to 10%, which is the lowest.  Because of the data loss from other 
legitimate vehicles, the CV safety application will be unable to determine the location of legitimate 
vehicles. This will cause safety application failure to produce accurate output. For example, if the 
SSGA application produces incorrect output, the conflict between vehicles might have a negative 
consequence and conflict can potentially lead to a crash. In our experiments, a conflict was 
recorded as occurring when two vehicles are in close proximity with a time headway of less than 
1.5 s (30, 31). In Section 4.6, an assessment was conducted on the probability of a conflict being 
caused by a DDoS attack. 
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FIGURE 3 Effect on data receiving rate with different numbers of DDoS attackers. 
4.4 Attack detection by CVGuard 
As discussed in Section 3, CVGuard monitors the context of vehicles. When rules defined for those 
vehicles are violated, a malicious activity occurs. CVGuard can detect DDoS attacks and identify 
the attacker in the CV environment by using the detection policies (e.g., rule set {e, f}) on missing 
data, and the attacker’s DRR. In the case of a DDoS attack, the DRR of the attacker will be high, 
and the DRR of the other vehicles will decrease as shown in section 4.3. This will cause a violation 
of policy set {e, f}. According to the rule {e}, RSU will get more data than expected from an 
attacker. In addition, because of flooding the network, RSU will not receive the data from other 
vehicles that will cause the violation of rule {f}. Thus, it will get less amount of data from other 
vehicles to run the application properly thereby making the application service unavailable. 
However, by monitoring the violation of the policy set:{e, f}, microBox will be able to detect the 
DDoS attack. 
4.5 Attack prevention by CVGuard 
CVGuard not only identifies the attackers but can also implement countermeasures to mitigate the 
effect of attacks. In the CV environment, affected components cannot just block the attackers as 
typically happens in traditional DDoS prevention systems, since in order to perform safety 
operations, the location information of attackers is also necessary. Upon the detection of the DDoS 
attack, CVGuard creates a microBox to prevent the DDoS attack. The purpose of this DDoS 
prevention microBox is to limit the data flow to the safety application. If we can limit the data 
flow to the application, the application will not be overloaded by unnecessary BSM messages from 
attackers. We can limit the boundary of message consumption of the application as follows:    
𝛼 ≤ 𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≤
𝐶
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠
 × 𝛽                    (13) 
where, 𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is the data receiving rate for operating the application properly, 𝛼 is the 
minimum data receiving rate required for operating the application and giving a correct output, 𝐶 
is the maximum capacity of the receivers and 𝛽 represents the limiting factor for the upper bound 
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data rate. The values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 depends on the requirements of the CV applications and the 
attackers’ sending rate. For example, a SSGA application operating at 10 Hz. (28) means the 
receiver should receive data in every 100 ms also can be referred as sampling time. For the SSGA 
application, the requirement consists of the safe distance and the average velocity of the corridor. 
The determination of sampling time  𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙  is crucial in providing a better service to the other 
vehicles. The DDoS prevention module for SSGA will decide the value of sampling. The selection 
of  𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 can be mathematically expressed as  
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 ≥
𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒
𝑉𝑎 𝑣𝑔
 (14) 
where  𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 is the sampling time for collecting data from legitimate vehicles, 𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 is the 
minimum distance for safe operations that depends on the roadway conditions, and 𝑉𝑎𝑣𝑔 is the 
average vehicle speed on the subject roadway that is extracted from the data of other vehicles. We 
chose the minimum of 100 ms and 1/𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 as 𝛼 in Equation (13) to ensure that the SSGA 
application can operate properly. As shown in Figure 2, the prevention module within a microBox 
will first classify the data into to two categories, the benign data and the attackers’ data. The benign 
data will be processed normally and delivered to the app. The attackers’ data will be processed by 
the prevention component. In the DDoS attack case, the data will be sampled according to Equation 
(14). The primary actions taken by CVGuard upon the detection of a malicious DDoS attack are 
described as follows. 
(a) Action 1:  According to the detection result, microBox launches the prevention module for a 
DDoS attack. The prevention module consists of three components: traffic classification, attack 
mitigation, and normal processing.  
(b) Action 2: The attack mitigation component calculates 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 based on the attackers’ 
condition (e.g., number of attackers, attackers’ data transmission rate) and other vehicles 
conditions (e.g., number of vehicles, average speed)  by considering α and 𝛽 
(c) Action 3: The mitigation component collects legitimate vehicle data for time 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 and 
attackers’ data from 1/𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 time interval; it then feeds these data to the CV application.  
4.6 Evaluation of CVGuard under DDoS attack 
Performance evaluations of the CVGuard system under DDoS attacks were conducted using a 
SSGA applicaiton with and without CVGuard to evaluate the effectiveness of the CVGuard 
system. In our experiment, three DDoS attackers (as per Section 4.2) compromised the SSGA 
application, which caused conflicts at the intersection because the SSGA application was unable 
to determine the location of both the major and minor road vehicles. In the real-world, the roadway 
traffic conditions change frequently. Our simulations consisted of 50 major road vehicles and a 
variable number of minor road vehicles (varying from 5 to 45). Using the minor road vs major 
road vehicle ratio, we were able to determine the effect of the roadway traffic condition (e.g., 
number of conflicts) during a DDoS attack. We set 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙  at 100 ms as the minimum sampling 
time with β = 1 in our simulation. As shown in Figure 4(a), using three attackers and each of them 
transmitting at 500 packets/sec, the mean percentage of conflict was about 28.35% before 
CVGuard intervention and mean percentage of conflict was approximately 12.65% after the 
CVGuard deployment. In addition, the rate of conflicts depends on the attackers’ message 
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transmission capability (e.g., transmission rate). Figure 4(b) shows that if the attackers’ 
transmission rate increases the probability of conflicts in the intersection increases proportionally. 
However, after CVGuard integration, the probability of conflicts decreased providing more safety 
under the DDoS attack scenario with three attackers. For instance, we observed a 46.87% to 
18.75% drop in the rate of conflicts in our experiment when each of the attacker’s data transmission 
rate was 1000 packets/sec. Figure 4(c) shows the percentage-reduction of conflicts when CVGuard 
was deployed under the DDoS attack. After CVGuard integration, the possibility of conflict was 
reduced by 60% on average. 
 
4 (a) Comparison of percentage of conflicts before and after the deployment of CVGuard 
having 𝑵𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒓𝒔 = 𝟑 and Attackers’ data transmission rate= 500 packets/sec. 
 
4 (b) Comparison of percentage of conflicts before and after 
 the deployment of CVGuard having 𝑵𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒓𝒔 = 𝟑. 
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4 (c) Reduction of conflicts by CVGuard under DDoS attack 
FIGURE 4 Improvement of conditions before and after the deployment of CVGuard. 
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Because the connected vehicle environment is evolving rapidly, the need for cybersecurity 
protection is necessary for the near future. Because of cost and maintenance issues, hardware-
based security solutions (e.g., hardware security modules) are not feasible. Software-based 
solutions are much cheaper and dynamically configurable. However, the challenge lies in selecting 
appropriate methods to protect connected vehicles against cybersecurity threats. Emerging 
technologies, such as edge computing, SDN, and NFV, have a great potential to make innovations 
for effective cybersecurity solutions in a connected vehicle environment. This paper presents a 
novel secure architecture called CVGuard to mitigate V2I cybersecurity threats by leveraging edge 
computing, SDN, and NFV. First, a case study was conducted encompassing a simulated DDoS 
attack to determine associated adverse impacts on SSGA due to the attack. Simulation analysis 
shows that because of the DDoS attack, the DRR by an RSU for SSGA dropped to 10% compared 
to normal DRR (93%). Second, from a V2I application point of view, the drop in the receiving 
data rate caused the SSGA application to malfunction and created vehicle conflicts in an 
unsignalized intersection. Third, following the case study, CVGuard proved its capability by 
detecting and preventing the DDoS attack and by mitigating its adverse effects. Our analysis shows 
that the strategies adopted by CVGuard were successful in reducing DDoS attack created vehicle 
conflicts by 60% where a DDoS attack compromised the SSGA application at an unsignalized 
intersection.  Currently, our study is only limited to DDoS attack. Also, we considered 100% 
connected vehicles in our simulation, but in real-world traffic, a mixed traffic situation will exist 
with connected and non-connected vehicles in the traffic stream. Future study will include 
mitigation of the most common types of cyberattack mentioned in section 2, and creation of 
different mixed traffic scenarios to evaluate the solutions by CVGuard. We will develop additional 
modules for the CVGuard system to make the system more robust, scalable, and flexible. Because 
the CVGuard is a software-based solution, it will be possible to develop different modules by other 
researchers and developers to contribute to the continuous development of the CVGuard platform. 
Also, more extensive experiments will be conducted in the near future in the real-world CV 
environment to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the CVGuard system.  
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